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INTRODUCTION
Seller argues that its premature notice of forfeiture made "no
difference" to Buyer, and therefore did not violate the strict
compliance rule, because the jury could have "inferred" from the
evidence that even if Seller had given Buyer its full 30 days to
cure, Buyer would not have paid in the last two days.
Seller's argument, in effect, requires this Court to replace
the "strict compliance" rule with a "substantial compliance" rule,
because it treats the last two days of the cure period as being
unimportant.

In determining whether a forfeiture

is valid,

however, the law should treat the last two days of a cure period as
being extremely important—more important than the preceding 28
days.

The law should recognize that many people, when faced with

a deadline, wait until the last day to perform the required act.
Therefore, it would be unfair for a seller to have the right to
unilaterally cut short the cure period by even one day.
Moreover, the inference that Seller argues the jury could have
drawn from the evidence is speculative.

There was no direct

testimony at trial from any of Buyer's representatives, including
Mr. Busch, as to what Buyer would have done if the notice of
forfeiture had not been two days premature. Although Mr. Busch did
testify as to why he did not pay the second annual installment
(i.e., his dispute with Mr. Siggard over the perimeter boundary
survey, etc.), such testimony was in the context of what actually
happened - Seller's premature delivery of the notice of forfeiture.
For the jury to conclude that, if Mr. Busch had been given the full
30 days to cure, he still would not have paid, requires the jury to

speculate as to what Mr. Busch would have done under a different
set of circumstances.
The law should not permit a jury or a judge to speculate as to
whether a buyer would have cured its default in the final days of
the cure period. Even if a buyer told a seller, "I absolutely will
not cure my default," the law should allow for the very real
possibility that, because a buyer stands to lose its equity, the
buyer might change its mind and cure on the last day.
In the instant case, Buyer invested over $200,000 of its own
money in obtaining commercial zoning for the property (Tr. 134:1025, 135:1) and thereby increased the property's value at least
four-fold .

For Buyer to simply walk away from this investment

would have been utterly foolish.

Never did Mr. Busch or any of

Buyer's representatives testify that Buyer did not intend to pay,
did not want to pay, or would not have paid the second annual
installment had Buyer been given its full opportunity to cure the
default. As a matter of law, Seller should not be permitted to cut
short by two days Buyer's opportunity to cure and thereby save its
investment based solely on the jury's speculation that Buyer would
not have made the payment in the last two days.
Seller also argues that, by this appeal, Buyer seeks relief
that is indistinguishable from the remedy of specific performance,
which the jury rejected.

To the contrary, the relief that Buyer

Prior to commercial zoning being approved by Sandy City, the
property had a value of $25,000 per acre. (Tr. 378:24-25, 379:1-9;
cf. Tr. 434:11-25, 435:1-3.) After commercial zoning was approved,
the property's value increased to between $98,000 and $180,000 per
acre. (Tr. 313:17-20, 632:24-25.)
2

seeks is very different than specific performance. In requesting
specific performance (Buyer's first theory at trial), Buyer was
asking the court to (1) determine that Seller breached the contract
and (2) order Seller to perform it duties under the contract (such
as providing a survey) before Buyer would be required to make any
more payments thereunder.
In this appeal, Buyer concedes that Buyer, not Seller,
breached the contract.

But even given Buyer's breach, Seller is

not entitled to forfeit Buyer's interest in the contract without
complying with the forfeiture provisions of the contract (Buyer's
second theory at trial).

In other words, Buyer is asking this

Court to determine that Seller failed to forfeit Buyer's interest
under the contract and that Seller cannot do so until it gives
Buyer its full opportunity to cure. If this Court rules in Buyer's
favor, Buyer would be required to make all payments required by the
contract without regard to the Seller's conduct.
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF PACTS"
In arguing that Buyer did not intend to pay and therefore
would not have paid in the last two days, Seller makes several
factual assertions that are either mischaracterizations of the
evidence or improper speculation as to what Buyer would have done.
A.

Buyer's Payment of the First Annual Installment

In arguing that Buyer would not have paid the second annual
installment of $56,000, one of the factual assertions Seller relies
on is that Buyer failed to meet its obligation with regard to the
first annual installment.

(Appellees' Brief at 7-8.)
3

Seller

asserts, "In March, 1989, when the very first payment was overdue,
[Seller] had to provide [Buyer] with a Notice of Default before
[Buyer] ultimately paid the first delinquent payment." (Appellees'
Brief at 26

(emphasis added).)

In support of this factual

assertion, Seller cites to Trial Exhibit 16, which is Seller's
March 1989 notice of default to Buyer (see Appellees' Brief at 8 ) ,
and

also cites to Tr. 396:13-25, 397:1-13, & 399:8-17

(see

Appellees' Brief at 7-8, 26).
Seller's characterization of the first annual payment as
"delinquent" and "overdue" is false.

Under the terms of the

purchase contract, no payment was due by Buyer as of March 3, 1989,
because at that time the contract was void.

Paragraph 16 of the

contract provides:
Commercial Zoning. Buyer, at its expense, shall
apply for commercial zoning on the Property to build a
commercial center thereon. However, should Buyer fail,
with or without cause, to obtain such commercial zoning
prior to March 3, 1989, then the Contract shall be void
and the Down payment refunded to Buyer. [Trial Exhibit
7; Addendum to Appellant's Brief, page 4; Addendum B to
Appellee's Brief, page 4 (emphasis added).]
At trial, both Mr. Siggard and Mr. Busch testified that commercial
zoning was not obtained until August 1989.
25, 403:15-25, 404:1-2.)

(Tr. 133:13-19, 151:5-

It follows that the contract was void

when the first payment fell due.
After March 3, 1989, but prior to the Buyer's obtaining
commercial zoning, the parties negotiated and executed an amendment
to the contract which deleted paragraph 16 and reinstated the
contract.

(Trial Exhibit 17; Tr. 147-150, 398-401.) At that time,

4

Buyer paid a negotiated payment of $56,000.

(Tr. 149:6-8; 399-

400.)
The March 1989 notice of default, which Seller relies on,
contradicts rather than supports Seller's factual assertion. This
notice states that Buyer is in "default" under "section sixteen on
[sic]

the

contract"

commercial zoning).
installment

(which,

as

just

discussed,

deals

with

This notice does not say the first annual

is due or overdue; indeed, it makes no mention

whatsoever of the first annual installment.

(Trial Exhibit 16;

Addendum C to Appellees' Brief.)
The transcript pages cited by Seller also do not support
Seller7s factual assertion. In those pages, Mr. Siggard testifies
that he did not receive a payment on March 3, 1989, and that
thereafter he sent a notice of default to Buyer.

(Tr. 396:13-25,

397:1-13.) Nowhere in those pages does Mr. Siggard state that the
first annual installment was delinquent or overdue on March 3,
1989.2
B.

Buyer's Understanding of the Notice of Forfeiture

Another important factual assertion urged on this Court by
Seller is that, despite the unambiguous language of the notice of
forfeiture, Buyer understood it had not yet forfeited its rights.
In its brief, Seller states, "Notwithstanding [the premature notice
of forfeiture], [Buyer] understood that it had two days remaining

2

.

In questioning Mr. Siggard, Mr. Siggard's attorney asserts,
"On March 3rd of 1989 a payment under the contract was due." (Tr.
396:14-15.) However, it is axiomatic that Mr. Siggard's attorney
is not permitted to testify on behalf of Mr. Siggard.
5

before

[Buyer] would forfeit any rights under the Contract."

(Appellees7 Brief at 12.)

According to Seller, the notice of

forfeiture "did not preclude [Buyer] from attempting to cure its
breach;" Buyer could have cured its default in the two days
remaining

in

the

cure

period

"if

[Buyer]

had

chosen to."

(Appellees' Brief at 26, 33.)
These factual assertions are all based a one-sentence response
by Mr. Robert Busch to a question by Seller's attorney:
Q
Okay. In that two-day period, from April 3rd
to April 5th, did you pay $56,000 to Don and Glenna
Siggard?
A

No, but I could have.

(Tr. 252:7-10 (emphasis added).) Seller interprets the words, "but
I could have" to mean, "I understood that, notwithstanding the
notice of forfeiture, I had the legal right to pay," rather than
the obvious meaning, "I was financially capable of paying."
Seller's interpretation of the phrase, "but I could have" is
contradicted by the evidence. Seller's notice of forfeiture leaves
no doubt that upon Buyer's receipt of the notice, Seller is
treating the contract as being terminated.

It states, "[Buyer's]

receipt of this letter releases seller of all obligations to the
original contract."

(Trial Exhibit 21; Addendum to Appellant's

Brief, page 17; Addendum G to Appellees' Brief (emphasis added).)
Nowhere in the transcript did Mr. Busch testify that because
Seller's notice of forfeiture was premature, he understood the
notice as anything other than its face value indicated.

To the

contrary, he testified that when he received the notice, he was
6

shocked: "I had flames come out of my ears . . . .
believe that that would happen."

I just couldn't

(Tr. 165:16-18.)

To protect

himself from what he viewed as an "illegal forfeiture" (Tr. 166:2125), Mr. Busch immediately filed a notice of interest against the
property and had his attorney send a letter notifying Mr. Siggard
that the notice was two days early.

(Tr. 165-167.)

The only reasonable interpretation of Mr. Busch7s statement,
"but I could have," is that had Seller given Buyer the opportunity
to pay during the last two days of the cure period, Buyer "could
have" paid because Buyer was financially able to do so.
C.

Buyer's Intent Regarding the Second Annual Installment

Throughout its brief, Seller repeatedly asserts that Buyer did
not intend to pay the second annual installment.

In addition to

relying on "inferences" from the facts, Seller also cites directly
to the transcript in support of this assertion.

Each of these

The three places in Seller's brief where Seller cites to
the record in support of this assertion are as follows:
•

"[I]t is clear from the evidence that [Buyer] had no
intention of paying the $56,000 payment on March 3, 1990
or before April 5, 1990, the end of the 30 day cure
period. (R. 1612, Tr. 167:22-25; 168:1.)" (Appellees'
Brief at 12-13 (emphasis added).)

•

"[T]he jury received evidence that demonstrated that
[Buyer] had no intention of paying the $56,000 payment on
March 3, 1990 or at any time during the cure period. (R.
1612, Tr. 167:12-25, 168:1.)" (Appellees' Brief at 25
(emphasis added).)

•

"The evidence and the inferences the jury can draw from
the evidence additionally demonstrate that [Buyer] did
not want to make the annual payment (Tr. 167:22-25,
168:1) . . . ."
(Appellees' Brief at 31 (emphasis
added).)
7

direct citations relies on the same pages of the trial transcript
(167-68), in which Mr. Busch explained why, after receiving the
notice of forfeiture and instructing his counsel to send a letter
to Mr. Siggard, he did not make the $56,000 payment:
Q
At this point in time, Mr. Busch, did you ever
make the $56,000 payment to Mr. Siggard?
A

No.

Q
Did you ever offer to make the $56,000 payment
to Mr. Siggard at this period of time?
A
No.
I didn't offer to make the $56,000
payment.
And the reason I didn't make the $56,000
payment —
Q
Let me stop you.
$56,000 payment?

Why didn't you make the

A
I didn't make the $56,000 payment because I
knew that [Mr. Siggard] was not going to deliver me the
[perimeter boundary] survey and was trying to force me to
buy ground that I wasn't going to be able to use. I felt
we had to solve that problem before we could go any
further.
(Tr. 167:22-25; 168:1.)
In this same vein, Mr. Busch testified that when the second
annual installment fell due, "I didn't believe I owed [Siggard] the
money because he wouldn't sell me the ground that it said under the
contract that I had a right to buy and he wouldn't give me a
[perimeter boundary] survey."

(Tr. 257:8-11.)

The foregoing testimony does not support Seller's unqualified
assertion that Buyer "had no intention" of paying the second annual
installment.

This testimony shows at most that, in Mr. Busch's

mind, he was at that time excused from making the payment (i.e., he
didn't "owe" the money) because of a dispute between him and Mr.
8

Siggard.

More important, regardless of the reason why Mr. Busch

did not pay the second annual installment of $56,000, such nonpayment was in the context of the premature delivery by Mr. Siggard
of the notice of forfeiture.

To infer that, even if Seller had

properly delivered the notice of forfeiture after the full cure
period, Mr. Busch absolutely would not have paid the $56,000 during
the last two days requires speculation.

If speculation is to be

permitted, one could also conclude that because Mr. Busch was an
experienced developer, and because Buyer had invested so much money
into the project, Mr. Busch might have changed his mind and decided
to pay on the last day to protect Buyer's interest in the property.
Of course, this too would simply be speculation.
D.
•

Miscellaneous Facts

Seller asserts that Buyer failed to meet its obligations under
the contract by not obtaining the rezoning of the 20 acres
before March 3, 1989.

(Appellees' Brief at 7.)

But failure

to obtain zoning was not a default under the contract.
Paragraph 16 of the contract, quoted above, voids the contract
if zoning is not obtained, regardless of the reason ("with or
without cause") for Buyer's failure to obtain it.
•

Speaking of the notice of default, Seller incredibly asserts
that Buyer "knew . . . the notice was a forfeiture notice"
(Appellees7 Brief at 24 (emphasis added), citing Tr. 164:912.)

On that page of the transcript, Mr. Busch was asked to

pick up the notice of forfeiture exhibit, and mistakenly

9

picked up the notice of default exhibit.
corrects his mistake six lines down.
•

He immediately

(See Tr. 164:13-18.)

Seller asserts that Buyer's April 4, 1990 letter to Siggards
does not "state any excuse for failing to make the [second
annual] payment."

(Appellee's Brief at 26.) To the contrary,

the letter states in the last paragraph on the first page that
Mr. Siggard failed to provide a certified ALTA survey and
therefore is in breach of the contract.
Addendum

to Appellant's

Brief, page

(Trial Exhibit 23;
21; Addendum

H

to

Appellees' Brief.)
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Should Refuse to Substitute a "Substantial
Compliance" Rule in Place of Utah's Strict Compliance Rule
Seller characterizes its giving of the notice of forfeiture

two days early as a mere "technical violation" of the strict
compliance rule.

(Appellees' Brief at 25.) Seller argues that its

sending of the notice of forfeiture was merely

a technical

formality (Appellees' Brief at 24) ; that, regardless of when Seller
received the notice of forfeiture, its purpose had already been
served because Buyer received and understood the original notice of
default (Appellees' Brief at 23-24, 27-31); that Buyer "had no
intention" of making the required payment (Appellees' Brief at 1213, 25); and that, consequently, Buyer's premature receipt of the
notice of forfeiture "made no difference." (Appellees' Brief, at
24).

Therefore, Seller asserts, it complied with the strict

compliance
substance."

rule;

to

hold

otherwise

(Appellee's Brief at 32.)
10

would

"place

form

over

In effect, Seller is urging this Court to substitute a
"substantial compliance" rule in place of the strict compliance
rule articulated in Grow v. Marwick Development Inc., 621 P.2d 1249
(Utah 1980) and Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987).
Under such a rule, a seller who sends notice of forfeiture
prematurely could be said to have "strictly complied" with the
notice provisions of the contract if a jury or judge determines
that the buyer would not have made the payment anyway.
The substantial compliance rule proposed by Seller has four
major problems: (A) It treats the sending of a notice of forfeiture
as a mere technical formality, when in fact it is a substantive
requirement negotiated and agreed to under the contract.

(B) It

would require this Court to overturn Grow v. Marwick and Adair v.
Bracken.

(C) It treats the final days of the cure period as being

unimportant, when in fact they are the most critical time in the
cure period.

(D) It requires a jury or a judge to speculate as to

whether a buyer who receives premature notice of forfeiture would
have paid in the remaining days of the cure period.
A.

Sending a Notice of Forfeiture Is A Substantive, Not a
Technical, Requirement

This Court has held that sending a notice of forfeiture is not
just a technical formality, but is an essential, substantive
requirement.

In Adair v. Bracken. 745 P.2d 849, 853 (Utah App.

1987), this Court stated:
A notice of forfeiture is a declaration that the
seller is no longer just threatening to invoke this
contractual remedy, but has in fact elected the
forfeiture option—after the buyers' failure to cure the
default within a reasonable time after adequate notice of
11

default—and
has thereby terminated
the buyers'
contractual interest. . . . A notice of forfeiture leaves
no room for speculation about the extinguishment of the
buyers' rights in the contract.
Although it is true in the instant case that Buyer received
and understood the notice of default, in which Seller gave Buyer 30
days in which to cure, it is equally true that on the 28th day
Buyer received a notice stating unequivocally that Buyer's receipt
of the notice released Seller of all obligations under the original
contract, i.e., Seller was treating the contract as terminated.
Buyer's premature receipt of the notice could mean only one thing
4
to Buyer: Seller had forfeited Buyer's rights two days early.
B.
This Court Should Not Overrule Grow v. Marwick or Adair
v. Bracken
Seller's argument, in effect, asks this Court to overrule Grow
v. Marwick Development Inc.. 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980) and Adair v.
Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987), which both require a seller
to strictly comply with the notice provisions of the contract in
attempting to forfeit a buyer's interest.
Seller, of course, does not say this. Seller argues that Grow
v. Marwick and Ada ir v. Bracken are distinguishable because in
those cases, the buyer tendered payment while in the instant case
buyer did not.

In those cases, however, the improper notice by
5 .
seller led buyer into thinking it could still tender payment; in
4

.
.
.
Mr. Busch testified that Mr. Siggard "gave me 30 days [in
which to cure the default], then forfeits me out in 28." (Tr.
166:23-25.)
5
In Grow v. Marwick Development Inc. , 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah
1980), the improper notices led the buyer to believe "that he would
have additional time" to make the payment. Id. at 1252. In Adair
12

the instant case, Seller's improper notice led Buyer into thinking
it could not tender payment. To impose on a buyer the requirement
that it tender payment after seller has unequivocally stated the
contract is terminated would be to require the buyer to perform "a
useless act," Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot, 620 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Kan.
App. 1980), which the law does not require.
Seller also attempts to distinguish Grow and Adair on the
grounds

that

those

cases

deal

only

with

notices

that

are

"substantively defective in their content" (Appellees' Brief at
31), not with cases where a notice is delivered prematurely.
The distinction Seller attempts to draw between "content" and
"delivery" is meaningless. The problem addressed by both Grow and
Adair is the misleading, confusing nature of the notices. Where a
notice of default states that a buyer has 30 days to cure, but the
buyer receives the notice of forfeiture before the 30 days, the
buyer would be just as misled or confused as if the content of the
notice was improper.

Grow and Adair contain no language limiting

the strict compliance rule to content; the rule applies with just
as much force to premature delivery of the notice of forfeiture.
Seller cites cases from other jurisdictions to support its
content/delivery distinction. In none of the published cases cited
by Seller

did the party claiming improper notice receive a

v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987), the improper notices led
buyers to assume that "their continued default was being tolerated"
and that "their contractual rights were intact." Id. at 853.
One of the cases cited by Seller, Hill v. Johnson. 713 P.2d
493 (Mem. Dec. Kan. 1985), is unpublished and consequently ought
not be relied upon by this Court.
13

premature notice of forfeiture; in each of those cases, the
deficiency in the notice was inconsequential.

In any event, to

the extent those cases support a "substantial compliance" rather
than a "strict compliance" rule, they are at odds with Grow v.
Marwick and Adair v. Brackenf and therefore are not persuasive
authority.
C

The Law Should Treat the Last Few Days of the Cure Period
As Being Critical

In determining whether a forfeiture is valid, the law should
treat the last few days of a cure period as being critical.

The

law should recognize that many people, when faced with a deadline,
wait until the very last day to perform the required act.
and judges are well aware of this.

Courts

For example, notices of appeal

are frequently filed on the last day.
In the instant case, Mr. Busch was faced with a difficult
decision. Should he pay the second annual installment of $56,000,
even though (in Mr. Busch,s mind) Mr. Siggard had breached the
contract by failing to provide the perimeter boundary survey and by
attempting to force Mr. Busch to buy more ground than he was
In Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot, 620 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Kan. App.
1980), the claimed deficiency was that the mechanic's lien notice
did not bear the required statutory legend, "showing address where
delivered."
The court ruled the notice sufficient because the
recipient of the notice stipulated that the notice was delivered to
the proper address. In Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3rd 552,
166 Cal. Rptr. 620 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1980), the court held that
the statutory three-day notice to quit was sufficient for an
eviction, even though the contract required five days to cure,
because the lessee's effectively had 11 days to cure before the
lessors filed their eviction action. In Midwest Uranium Co. v.
Craig, 215 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1953), the court held that the
parties treated verbal notice as substantial compliance with the
contractual notice requirements.
14

obligated buy to under the contract? Under such circumstances, the
law should anticipate the possibility that Mr. Busch might wait
until the very last day to perform the required act.
D.

The Law Should Not Require Speculation as to Whether a
Buyer Who Receives a Premature Notice of Forfeiture Would
Have Paid During the Remaining Days of the Cure Period

"[I]t is well settled that the court may not permit the jury
to speculate upon the evidence and that a finding of fact cannot be
based upon surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation."
Warwood. 255 P.2d 725, 727 (Utah 1953).

Olsen v.

If a buyer attempted to

testify as to what he would have done if he had received the notice
of forfeiture on time, such testimony would be inadmissible as
speculative.

State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah App. 1996)

(what a defendant may have done under different circumstances is
speculative); Cottrell v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 863
P.2d 381, 385 (Mont. 1993) ("speculative testimony is inadmissible
as evidence").

Consequently, to require a jury or a judge to

determine whether a buyer would or would not have cured its default
in the last few days of the cure period had the notice of
forfeiture

been properly

delivered

would

require

speculation

because in every case the jury or judge will lack direct testimony
as to what the buyer would have done.
Even if a buyer told a seller, "I absolutely will not cure my
default" after receiving a notice of default but before receiving
the notice of forfeiture, the law should require the seller to wait
until the full cure period has expired before giving the notice of
forfeiture, because it is a very real possibility that the buyer,
15

who stands to lose its equity in the property, might change its
mind and pay on the last day.
In the instant case, Buyer invested over $200,000 of its own
money in obtaining commercial zoning for the property (Tr. 134:1025, 135:1) and thereby increased the property's value at least
o

four-fold (and perhaps seven-fold) . Although Mr. Busch testified
that he did not feel he "owed" the second payment because he had
been unable to resolve his dispute with Mr. Siggard, he did not
testify (nor could he) what he would have done had the notice of
forfeiture not been delivered prematurely.
would have done requires speculation.9

To conclude what he

Regardless of what the evidence indicated about Mr. Busch's
state of mind when the second annual installment payment fell due,
it was not for the jury to speculate as to whether Buyer would or
would not have paid that installment.

The issue for the jury to

determine was whether Seller gave Buyer its full opportunity to
cure the default, allowing for the possibility that, Buyer might
have paid

in the last two days to preserve

its substantial

investment and equity in the property.

See footnote number 1 on page 2, supra.
9
.
.
.
.
If speculation is permitted, one could imagine that, if the
notice of forfeiture had not been delivered prematurely, Mr. Busch
might have laid in bed the night before the last day to cure,
thinking, "Even though Mr. Siggard has breached the contract, and
therefore I don't feel like I should make this payment, I shouldn't
take the chance of losing my investment in the property, and
therefore I will make the payment." Of course this is silly,
because it too is nothing more than speculation.
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E.

Conclusion

Forfeiture is a harsh remedy and is abhorred by the courts.
Unlike other remedies, which protect a buyer's equity or give a
buyer a period of time in which to redeem the property (see Brief
of Appellant at 16 nn. 4 & 5) , a forfeiture irrevocably terminates
a buyer's equity interest in the property.

Consequently, the

strict compliance rule should mean what it says: strict (not
substantial) compliance.

The law should require a seller to give

a buyer the full amount of time in which to cure.

When the full

amount of time is not given, the law should not require speculation
as to whether a buyer would have paid, but should give the benefit
of any doubt as to whether a buyer might have paid to the buyer.
II.

The Conclusions that Seller Seeks to Draw from the Facts Are
Based on Mischaracterizations of Fact and Speculation As to
What Buyer Would Have Done
Seller

asserts

the

evidence

shows

that

Buyer

"had

no

intention" of paying the second annual installment. This assertion
finds no direct support in the evidence. Never did any of Buyer's
representatives, including Mr. Busch, testify that Buyer did not
intend to pay the second annual installment.

The only way Seller

can make this argument is through factual "inferences," a word
which Seller uses frequently in its brief.

(See Appellees' Brief

at 1, 22, 27, 31.)
As has been discussed in the Facts section, supra, several of
the facts on which Seller bases its inferences are mischaracterized. For example, Buyer's payment of the first annual installment
was not "delinquent."

At the time the first annual installment
17

fell due, the contract had, by its own terms, become void.

(The

parties later amended the contract so as to reinstate it.) Another
example: Mr. Busch7s testimony that he "could have" paid obviously
means that he had the financial ability to pay, not that he
believed (contrary to the forfeiture notice) that he had the legal
right to pay.
Furthermore, considering the facts that Seller does not
mischaracterize, the inferences Seller draws from those facts are
speculative. Even considering that Buyer failed to pay the $5,000
down payment; that Buyer attempted to re-negotiate the contract so
that Seller would not have to make the annual interest payment;
that Mr. Busch testified he did not make the March 1990 payment
because of his dispute with Mr. Siggard over the boundary survey,
etc.; and that Mr. Busch felt he did not "owe" the money, it
requires serious speculation to conclude that Buyer would not have
paid in the last two days of the cure period.

There was no

testimony by Mr. Busch as to what he would have done had he been
given two

additional

days

in which

to

cure.

Indeed, as

previously argued, had Mr. Busch attempted to so testify, such
testimony would have been inadmissible as being speculative.
Cottrell v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. . 863 P.2d 381, 385
(Mont. 1993).

Even Mr. Busch could not have given an answer—he, too, did
not know what he might have done had he been given the critical
last two days of the cure period. He could not predict the future
any better than anyone else.
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The jury in this case should not be permitted to speculate as
to what Buyer would have done.

Similarly, this Court should not

base its decision on such speculation.

III. Buyer Does Not Seek A Remedy the Jury Rejected
Seller argues that because the jury found Buyer was not
entitled to specific performance, Buyer is not entitled to raise on
appeal the issue of whether Seller's attempted forfeiture complied
with the contract. Seller asserts that Buyer is seeking "a remedy
that is indistinguishable from specific performance" and that Buyer
"is not entitled to relief for a claim it has not appealed."
(Appellees' Brief at 20.)
This argument misstates Buyer's appeal.

In filing this

appeal, Buyer is not asserting a new "claim;" rather, Buyer is
challenging Seller's right to forfeit Buyer's interest under the
contract. The two are very different. Even if Buyer breached the
contract and is therefore not entitled to specific performance,
Seller cannot forfeit Buyer's interest without giving Buyer proper
notice under the contract.
The jury, in rejecting specific performance, did not determine
that Buyer was not entitled to insist that Seller comply with the
forfeiture provisions of the contract.
jury

regarding

specific

forfeiture requirements.

performance

The instructions to the
make

no mention

of

the

The jury was instructed that to find

Buyer was entitled to specific performance, it must find (1) the
existence of a valid contract; (2) that Buyer was excused from
19

tendering the second annual installment; (3) that Seller was in
default of a material obligation under the contract, and (4) that
Buyer had clean hands in performing its duties under the contract,
(Jury Instruction 18; R. 993.) As to Seller's "default" under the
contract, the jury was instructed that Buyer claimed Seller had
failed to provide a survey.

(Jury Instruction 25, R. 1000; see

also Jury Instruction 35, R. 1009.) The instruction regarding the
strict compliance rule was wholly separate.

(Jury Instruction 38,

R. 1012.)
Moreover, the relief that Buyer seeks is very different than
specific performance. Had Buyer prevailed at trial in its specific
performance

claim, it would have been entitled

to an order

requiring seller to perform all its duties under the contract
(including the providing of required surveys, etc.) before Buyer
would be required to make any payments under the contract.

In

contrast, if Buyer prevails on this appeal, it will not be entitled
to require Seller to provide any surveys or perform any other
duties under the contract as a condition to Buyer making the
required contractual payments.

The Buyer would simply get two

additional days in which make the required contractual payments.

IV.

Buyer's Filing of The Notice of Interest Was Not Groundless
In arguing that the jury's finding of wrongful lien was

supported by the evidence, Seller does not dispute, and therefore
concedes, three points from Buyer's initial brief regarding Buyer's
right to designate its acreage:
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•

Under the contract, Buyer had the right to designate its
acreage

anywhere within

the

38-acre parcel,

(See

Appellant's Brief at 24.)
•

The purchase contract did not require designation of
Buyer's acreage prior to site plan approval by Sandy
City.

•

(Appellant's Brief at 25.)

At no time prior to trial did Sandy City grant site plan
approval.

(Appellant's Brief at 25.)

Buyer submits that these three points, by themselves, provide
a sufficient basis for this Court to overturn the jury's finding of
wrongful lien.

If Buyer had the legal right to designate its

acreage anywhere within the 38 acres, then Buyer also had the right
to file a lis pendens against the entire 38 acres.
Seller asserts that because Buyer knew where the commercial
zone was to be placed, Buyer should have limited its notice of
interest to that zone. But Seller concedes, and it is undisputed,
that the commercial zone was only 13 acres (Appellees' Brief at 37,
f4; Tr. 138-139, 211), and that the total acreage Buyer was
required to purchase was 16 acres.

(Appellees' Brief at 8-9.)

This leaves three acres outside of the commercial zone that Buyer
could designate anywhere Buyer wished.
Regarding these three additional acres, Mr. Busch testified
that they would not necessarily be contiguous to the boundaries of
the commercial property.

(Tr. 240:13-18, 241:4-8.)

As of August

1989, when Sandy City approved the commercial zoning, he had not
determined where Buyer would purchase the additional three acres.
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(Tr. 242:24-25, 243:1-4.) Mr. Busch testified that he was going to
to make that determination "as soon as we got site plan approval"
(Tr:

243:3-4),

and

that

he

thought

about

taking

the

three

additional acres "on the down side" (meaning on 10th East) or "up
above" (meaning on 14th South) or "back behind."

(Tr. 243:6-17.)

Seller relies on Bianco v. Patterson, 768 P.2d 204 (Ariz. App.
1989),

as being

"very

(Appellee,s Brief at 39.)

similar to the

facts of this case."

Bianco, however, has a crucial factual

distinction. The buyer in that case did not have a right to choose
acreage anywhere within the entire tract.

The buyer was entitled

only to receive back from the seller a quit claim deed "to a
specified 40-acre parcel of land." Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
Consequently, "[b]y the terms of the [purchase] agreement, and as
stated in [buyer's] request for relief . . ., only the specified 40
acres could be the subject of a lis pendens, not all the property
proposed in the [purchase] agreement."

Id. at 206.

Unlike Bianco. Buyer in this case had a right to designate its
acreage (and especially the three acres outside the commercial
zone) anywhere it chose.
CONCLUSION
This Court should refuse to replace the strict compliance rule
with a substantial compliance rule, or to permit a seller to
prematurely forfeit a buyer's rights under a real estate contract
based on speculation as to what the buyer "would" have done if the
notice of forfeiture were not premature.
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Therefore, the jury's

verdict should be reversed, and Buyer should be granted its
requested relief.
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day of November, 1996.
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